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Philosophy as Religion and the Meaning of ‘Providence’ in Middle Platonism 
George Boys-Stones 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been well and often observed that Platonism, as it emerged at the end of the 
Hellenistic era, is distinguished by its ‘religious’ character; even that it might in some 
sense be considered as a religion.
1
 The observation is typically linked to particular 
themes within Platonism: the immortality of the soul and its fate after death, for 
example; or the description of god in terms which suggest a reciprocal, ‘personal’ 
relationship with him as our benefactor and father, and a proper object of our love. But a 
stronger case still suggests itself at certain points in the Platonists’ own second-order 
commentary on their project. Plutarch represents the cosmos as a ‘temple’, and in doing 
so assimilates philosophical inquiry to initiation into the mysteries; Theon of Smyrna 
actually works out an elaborate correspondence between degrees of initiation and stages 
in the philosophical curriculum.
2
 That this is not simply the metaphorical appropriation 
of religious language is suggested by the fact that Platonists do in fact read, and so 
claim common cause with, ‘conventional’ religious traditions, understanding them as 
forerunners and guides in the attempt to do just what Platonism is doing.
3
  
 And yet it also easy to feel that there is at the very least some tension in what we 
expect from a ‘religious’ account of god and what we very quickly find in the more 
detailed philosophical analysis offered by Platonists. The god whom we are supposed to 
love as a beneficent father is revealed to be an impersonal, transcendent and eternal 
form, the form of the good; his thoughts are of forms too, not of us; he is variously 
assimilated to the Pythagorean One, and the Aristotelian self-thinking intellect; he is so 
                                                     
1
 E.g. Dörrie (1976), (1981). Plutarch’s ‘religious’ character has been especially remarked on: 
e.g. Dillon (1986); Brenk (1987), (1988); and see discussions in Hirsch-Luipold (2005). 
2
 Respectively, Plutarch, On Tranquillity 477CD, and Theon, On the Utility of Mathematics 
14.18-16.2 Hiller. The image of the cosmos as temple is also found in Dio Chrysostom (Oration 
12.34); but I am not aware of anything comparable to Theon’s elaboration of its implications in 
non-Platonist sources of the era. 
3
 See Boys-Stones (2001), ch. 6; and Frazier (2005) for Plutarch in particular. Numenius 
envisages a philosophical methodology which involves confirming research results against what 
can be inferred from the ritual practices of ancient nations (fr. 1a des Places); Apuleius viewed 
initiation into mystery cults as part of his philosophical search for truth (Apology 55). 
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far above our own categories of understanding that he is precisely not anything we can 
think of him (or perhaps better: it) at all.
4
  
 This paper is an attempt to show that there is, in fact, no tension here. Platonist 
metaphysics, I shall argue, unfolds into an account of the world and of our place within 
it which quite naturally justifies a description of it in religious terms – an account, 
indeed, which goes a long way even to justify the description of it given by 
conventional religion. (Platonism is not, then, as it were another religion, but a pre-
eminent reflex – and vindication – of the religion that was already there.) This fact is 
obscured by an assumption that ‘religious’ language is used precisely as an alternative 
to rational explanatory account – perhaps because its objects defy philosophical 
explanation. There is, however, one case where this assumption can be put to the test. It 
concerns the term ‘providence’ (pronoia) – a term which, since it suggests the personal 
concern of god for us, is often taken to belong to the ‘religious’ description of god, and 
seems to operate in contrast to what metaphysicians might say.
5
 We can test our 
assumptions about the Platonist understanding of ‘providence’ because we are fortunate 
enough to possess an extended fragment from a work by the second-century Platonist 
Atticus which involves a finely-nuanced debate over the operation and scope of 
providence. The terms of this debate allow us an unusual opportunity to see what a 
Platonist of this period thinks essential in the idea of providence, and to trace the 
rational structures by which a particular conception of it can be defended. The results 
                                                     
4
 All of these thoughts are exemplified in the account of god in Alcinous, Didaskalikos ch. 10. 
Note that my discussion of Platonism assumes for the sake of simplicity a system (such as that 
of Atticus) in which the first cause, the form of the good, is identical with the demiurge; but 
everything that it says applies mutatis mutandis to more complex hierarchies, such as that of 
Numenius, in which the Good is prior to the demiurge (and no-one in the pre-Plotinian tradition 
thinks that there is a principle prior to the Good). 
5
 See e.g. Bozonis (1976); Ferrari (1999). I do not want to argue backwards from Neoplatonist 
discussions in this paper, but it is worth noting that one would not be tempted to the assumption 
in the first place if one did start from them. Plotinus, for example, insists that we not think of 
divine providence in anthropomorphic terms (I take it that this is point of Enneads 3.2.1.10-15; 
cf. 3.2.1.44-5), and in general on distancing the idea of divine providence from acts of 
discursive ‘reasoning’ (3.2.2.8-9; 3.2.3.4-5; 3.2.14.1-6). Similarly Proclus, Commentary on the 
Timaeus i. 414.7-416.5 Diehl (cf. Torraca 1993): providence is simply goodness in action 
(ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἡ πρόνοια τῆς ἀγαθότητος, 415.8-9). 
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will be surprising to anyone who thinks that a metaphysical principle cannot present 
itself to us as the proper object of service and worship.
6
 
 
2. Atticus against Aristotle 
Atticus wrote about providence in a book, known to us through extensive quotations by 
Eusebius, which warned against using Aristotle as a guide in the interpretation of Plato.
7
 
Providence, he says, is just one of the areas in which Aristotle’s thought could not be 
more different from that of Plato – and an unusually important area, one on which our 
whole happiness depends (fr. 3.9-11 des Places).  
 Atticus’ headline position, at least as it is often cited, is that Plato ascribes 
providence to god and Aristotle does not. If this were an accurate report, then it would 
look as if Atticus’ point must be that there is something about the nature of Plato’s 
                                                     
6
 Previous literature on the Platonist notion of providence, in addition to works cited in n. 1, 
includes Dörrie (1977) and Dragona-Monachou (1994). The present paper seeks something like 
a definition of providence, and limits itself to texts which are useful to this end; further Middle 
Platonist discussions include Plutarch, On Delay in Divine Punishment; also Abandoned 
Oracles 414F and On the Face in the Moon 927B for the role of providence in philosophical 
explanation; Philo of Alexandria, On Providence (fragments) (and see discussion in Frick 
1999). For providence in the narratives of Plutarch’s Lives, see e.g. Verniére (1983) and Swain 
(1989); Drews (2009) (411-642, esp. e.g. 456-7, 588) makes the topic central to a reading of 
Apuleius’ Metamorphoses. Providence is regularly associated with two further topics: the 
reward and punishment of virtue and vice (to the fore in Atticus fr. 3, and the theme of Plutarch, 
On Delay in Divine Punishment; cf. Philo, On Providence fr. 2 = Eusebius, Preparation for the 
Gospel 8.14), and the creation and maintenance of the world (cf. esp. Atticus fr. 4 des Places; 
Plutarch, Face in the Moon 927A; Philo, On the Creation of the World 10). In light of my 
discussion in what follows, I take it that the ‘metaphysical’ explanation for this, and other 
associations, is that cosmic orderliness is at issue (esp. Philo, On Providence fr. 2.1: the 
challenge is how to maintain a belief in providence in the face of apparent disorder; cf. later 
Plotinus, Enneads 3.2.2) – and that there is a substantial convergence of what is good and what 
is well ordered in Platonist thought. In this case, to be ‘provident’ (to be the cause of good for 
something) is to be a cause of orderliness.  
7
 On Atticus in general (about whose biography we know next to nothing), and the title and 
purpose of his anti-Aristotelian work, see Karamanolis (2006), ch. 4, esp. 151-6. I have given a 
translation of the full text of fr. 3 des Places (concerning providence) as an appendix to this 
paper. As noted above (n. 6), fr. 4 also deals with providence, in relation to Atticus’ belief that 
the cosmos has a beginning. This is another view that is sometimes taken to be a mark of faith 
rather than reasoned argument: see e.g. Trabattoni (1987). I have argued against this in Boys-
Stones (2011). 
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demiurge that makes him capable of a form of other-concern which is lacking in 
Aristotle’s first principle. This has some superficial plausibility, because Aristotle’s first 
principle notoriously is a self-thinking thinker, self-obsessed as it were in principle. 
Plato’s demiurge, by contrast, is characterised in in terms of his unbegrudging nature, 
and his desire to share the perfection he enjoys (Timaeus 29e).  
 On closer inspection, however, Atticus’ argument turns out to be rather more 
nuanced than this. Two things in particular call into serious doubt the idea that he rested 
his case on a contrast like this between the Aristotelian and Platonist gods. The first is 
that Atticus himself put no weight at all on the metaphysical character of Aristotle’s god 
– in other words, there is no sign that this is what struck him as the problem with 
Aristotle; the second is that Atticus almost certainly allowed that Aristotle’s god is 
capable of providential activity after all – but only denied that he exercises it towards 
human beings. 
 If Atticus does not attack the metaphysical character of Aristotle’s god, or 
reckon that the problem with Aristotle’s theory of providence lies with an ‘impersonal’ 
view of the deity, is this because Atticus’ assumptions about Aristotle’s god are very 
different from our own? Probably not. There is some evidence that Atticus takes 
Aristotle’s god to be the ‘first unmoved mover’ of Metaphysics Λ, just as we would 
tend to do: it must be this that he has in mind when he talks (in fr. 8 des Places, quoted 
below) about a single principle in Aristotle which is responsible for movement 
throughout in the cosmos. But in this case, it is likely that Atticus also thinks of this god 
as the self-thinking intellect of Λ.9 – a determinedly ‘impersonal’ deity. This is all the 
more likely, because we know that, for his own part, Atticus identified god with the 
form of the good (fr. 12 des Places). If Atticus puts no weight here on any difference 
between Plato and Aristotle on the intrinsic nature of god, the obvious conclusions are 
(a) that he sees no relevant difference between them, and (b) that he himself believes in 
a god who can be squarely located within the territory of the metaphysician. 
 If this is right, then it turns out already that Atticus does not assume that the 
language of ‘providence’ makes any determination of the intrinsic nature of god 
(beyond, presumably, his being a cause of good). It certainly does not suggest a 
‘religious’ perspective on god as opposed to a metaphysical perspective. But what, in 
that case, is the worry that Atticus has about Aristotle, a worry which causes him to 
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write at such length and with such passion? It turns out that it is not even that Aristotle’s 
god fails to exercise providence.
8
 It is rather that Aristotle’s god only exercises 
providence towards the heavenly bodies – or, to be more accurate, that his gods 
(including, then, the heavenly bodies themselves) keep providence to themselves. 
Atticus makes the point insistently throughout fr. 3: 
 
(57-9:) Both alike [Aristotle and Epicurus] think the gods have no concern for 
men, and provide the unjust with the same freedom from fear of the gods . . . (71-
2:) We are looking for a providence that is distinguished by its concern for us . . . 
(81-5:) This extraordinary sleuth of nature, this unerring judge of matters divine, 
placed human affairs under the very sight of the gods and let them go unheeded 
and uncared for, organised by ‘nature’ rather than god’s reason . . . (96-8:) He 
does not allow that there is anything outside the cosmos, and does not bring the 
gods into contact with things on earth . . .  
 
By contrast, says, Atticus, Plato ensured that god ‘cares for everything, including men’ 
(3.22-4). 
 The surviving works of Aristotle, as it happens, say nothing at all about 
providence, so the fact that Atticus does not simply help himself to the position that he 
does away with it altogether must indicate that he accepts a widespread belief about 
Aristotle, a clearer allusion to which Eusebius helpfully weaves into his introduction to 
the present passage (fr. 3.3-8):
9
 
 
Moses and the Hebrew prophets, and indeed Plato, who is in agreement with them 
in these matters, have set out their views on universal providence with great 
clarity. But Aristotle brings the realm of the divine to a halt at the moon . . .  
 
This, then, is the real object of Atticus’ disagreement, and the reason why he thinks that 
Aristotle is a dangerous guide to Platonic theology. It is not after all that Aristotle’s god 
                                                     
8
 Pace Karamanolis (2006), 160.  
9
 The elision of Aristotle with Epicurus in fr. 3.51 ff. would also have involved less argument 
and qualification if Atticus could have said, simply, that both denied providence outright.  
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is too metaphysical, and it is not that he fails to be provident. The problem is that his 
providence is only enjoyed in the heavens. But this qualified position is invaluable 
evidence for what ‘providence’ is taken to mean. If we can understand what sense 
Atticus might have made of the doctrine that providence only extends as far as the 
moon, we will be well on our way to understanding what the very term ‘providence’ 
means in the context of his debate with Aristotle. 
 
3. Providence ‘as far as the moon’ 
The claim that Aristotle held that providence reached as far as, but no further than, the 
moon is, it should be emphasised, extremely well attested in later reports of Aristotle 
and his school – by friends, foes and doxographers alike.10 (There is no question that 
Atticus is adopting a controversial or polemical stance in assuming that it holds of 
Aristotle.) And although ancient commentators do not gloss it for us, and modern 
commentators have despaired of understanding it all,
11
 there may be quite a 
straightforward explanation for it – and one which touches very closely on the present 
topic. If we assume that ‘providential’ activity will minimally involve the providential 
agent in being a cause of good to some beneficiary, then the explanation might lie 
precisely in the metaphysical framework provided by Aristotle for the transmission of 
benefit from the first principle. 
 It is presumably safe to assume that the ‘providence’ which flows from the first 
unmoved mover to the heavenly bodies is simply a matter of the orderly movement that 
the first mover imparts to them. Thanks to him, the first sphere of the heavens rotates 
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 See references in Moraux (1984), 571 n. 33; and, for discussion of the different treatments of 
the claim within the Peripatetic tradition, Sharples (2002), 22-36 (and cf. 1983, esp. 144-52). 
The only Peripatetic text which clearly rejects the view is the ps.-Aristotelian work On the 
Universe (although even it argues that the effects of providence are somehow weaker below the 
heavens: 6, 397b30). This work, conversely, accepts the idea that the cosmos is a unified, 
ensouled organism (5, 396b28-9; at 396a32 ff. the cosmos is likened to a city in a way which 
invites comparison with Atticus fr. 8 as quoted below in the text). For reasons which will 
become clear, this seems to me no coincidence. 
11
 Moraux resorts to suggesting that the claim is a product of confusion in the doxographical 
tradition (1984: 571). As Sharples notes, however (2002: 30), the view that providence stops at 
the moon is so well established that even someone as uncomfortable with it as Alexander does 
not question for a moment that Aristotle had been committed to it.  
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and carries the ‘fixed stars’ in their regular cycle; and this is a movement in which all 
the other heavenly bodies (carried on spheres driven by this first sphere) subsequently 
partake. We can say, then, that the first unmoved mover is the single, teleological cause 
of this movement for all the heavenly bodies, and that they are, to just this extent, 
beneficiaries of his providence.
12
 
 Below the heavens, however, things get more complicated. It is true that the first 
unmoved mover is also the ultimate explanation for the existence of movement below 
the moon; but he is not responsible for the particular movements that there are. For 
example, the sublunary realm as a whole is stationary, and does not share in the 
westward motion of the heavens at all; and nothing in that realm moves according to a 
pattern laid down by the first unmoved mover either. (No species of animal, for 
example, exhibits regular westward-drifting behaviour; or, if any such species exists, 
they do not exhibit this behaviour because of the first unmoved mover.) Instead, what 
happens below the moon is explained by the combined influence (not even of any 
sphere or spheres but) of the heavenly bodies. As these pass closer and move further 
away in their various combinations, they bring (or remove) warmth in patterns which 
account for the cycles of nature, the changing seasons, and the quality of different airs, 
waters, and places. (The clearest example of this process, noted on several occasions by 
Aristotle, is the cycle of seasonal regeneration and decay as the sun draws closer to the 
earth or moves further away from it.)
13
 Ultimately, because of this, the celestial bodies 
are held to be responsible for the natures of the creatures and plants born in different 
places at different times.  
 Aristotelians are far from alone in appealing to this sort of mechanism to explain 
sublunary activity. Indeed, as a description of the efficient causes involved, it amounts 
to something like a scientific consensus, one which was shared by Platonists too. But 
                                                     
12
 The movements of the heavenly bodies require, of course, more complexity than this: 
additional spheres add – and transmit – their own movements too. See On the Heavens 2.12; 
and Metaphysics Λ.8, with Lloyd (2000), esp. 256-66. The essential point, however, is that the 
first unmoved mover is not simply the cause of movement to the heavenly bodies, but is a non-
accidental cause of the very movement they have. 
13
 See esp. Aristotle, Generation and Corruption 2.10; Meteorology 1.2-3, 9; Metaphysics Λ.6. 
A more detailed account of this kind of theory is to be found in Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos (esp. 1.2); 
see Pérez Jiménez (2012) for traces in Plutarch (cf. also perhaps Apuleius, Florida 10). 
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Platonists made a further claim about this system which Aristotelians were not in a 
position to make. Platonists claimed that the celestial system is to be conceived as a 
unified entity with a single formal cause. Platonists in fact talk of the whole cosmos as a 
unified living organism, which is a copy in matter of the realm of the forms as a whole 
(itself referred to in this context as the unique and all-encompassing ‘intelligible 
animal’),14 and governed by its own soul, the ‘world soul’. Atticus himself believes that 
the existence of this unifying principle can be established by something like an 
argument from design (Atticus fr. 8 des Places): 
 
For if there is not a single animate power ‘pervading all’ and ‘binding everything 
and keeping it together’, the universe could not be arranged in a reasonable or 
beautiful way. It would be as short-sighted to hope that a city could ever come to 
be well arranged without a unifying principle as it is to think that one could 
advance an argument to preserve this universe, supremely beautiful as it obviously 
is, which did not bind it together and harmonise its parts by having them share in 
one common thing. Aristotle, then, said that there was something like this, which 
pervades everything as a principle of motion; but he would not allow that it is soul 
– even though Plato had shown that soul is the ‘principle and source’ of motion 
for all moving things. . .  
 
A fortiori, the heavens have a unified structure; and in fact the Platonist view is that the 
‘mind’ of the world soul is embodied in the orderly rotation of the heavens, which 
thereby play a special role in preserving order throughout the cosmos.  
 Aristotle and his followers, by contrast, deny that there is any cause for the 
overall structure of the heavens. This goes with the denial of transcendent forms: there 
is, for Aristotle, no ‘intelligible animal’, no paradigmatic model for the cosmos as a 
whole, and no world soul.
15
 Rather, order as it were ‘trickles down’ from the first 
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 Cf. Atticus fr. 34 des Places, referring to Plato, Timaeus 30c-31a; cf. 39e. 
15
 Plutarch, for example, notes Strato’s denial that ‘the cosmos was alive’ as a case of 
Peripatetic disagreement with the most important views of Plato (Against Colotes 1115B). 
(Aristotle’s assertion that there is ‘only one ouranos’ at Metaphysics Λ.8, 1074a38 is not, of 
course, a claim for the unity of the heavens, but for the singularity of the cosmos.) Compare in 
this light ps.-Justin, Dialogue 6, where (in a survey of differences between Plato and Aristotle) 
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unmoved mover. I have noted that the first unmoved mover explains the westward 
motion common to the heavenly bodies; but it does not explain why there are as many 
such bodies as there are – or the number of the spheres; it does not explain the particular 
additional motions associated with individual spheres, or for the combined effect that all 
these spheres moving together might have (via the movements they impart to the 
heavenly bodies) on anything below them. The first unmoved mover does not explain 
this – and nor does anything else. And it is because nothing, that is, no single or unified 
cause, is responsible for the overall structure of the heavens that nothing (no single or 
unified cause) is responsible for what happens beneath the heavens. But this means that 
nothing (no single or unified cause) is responsible for there being, for example, rivers 
and trees and human beings; let alone for the complexity of behaviours that these things 
exhibit. One way of thinking about this is to consider how different life on earth might 
have been if there had been just one more star or planet in the heavens, or one more 
sphere affecting the movements of the stars and planets. There must certainly have been 
different individuals in this case, or at the very least individuals who were different in 
some respect to those who now exist; and quite likely different species to boot. Consider 
next that there is no reason, and certainly no reason that lies with the first unmoved 
mover, why there is not one more sphere than there happens to be. 
 It is worth noting that the claim does not have to be that we derive no benefit 
from the celestial gods, or the first unmoved mover. An Aristotelian might well argue 
that, given the orderly movement of the heavens, order was always going to ensue down 
here as well. It may not, in this case (and despite Atticus’ assertions to the contrary), be 
a matter of chance that there is sublunary order; but more than this, one could, in 
consequence, think of the particular benefits that we happen to derive from this order as 
some reason for us to be grateful to god. One of the more spirited attempts made within 
the Peripatetic tradition to qualify the claim that providence stops at the moon says in 
fact that we are benefitted by the heavens – albeit accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) 
(Aetius 330.8-15 Diels; tr. after Sharples): 
                                                                                                                                                           
we are told that Plato has forms where Aristotle has gods. The roots of this obscure claim might 
lie precisely in the idea that Plato’s cosmos is constructed according to an eternal paradigmatic 
system – where Aristotle’s is the incidental result of the activity of a republic of divine 
individuals (the stars and planets). 
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Aristotle says that it [the cosmos] is neither ensouled throughout nor endowed 
with sense perception nor rational nor intellectual nor governed by providence. 
For the heavenly things share in all of these, since spheres which are ensouled 
and alive surround [the world]; but the things in the region of the earth [share 
in] none of them, and have a share in good order accidentally, not in a primary 
way. 
 
And Atticus himself seems to be aware of this line of argument: it must be the idea he 
refers to in 3.59-60, ‘that we receive some benefit from the gods although they remain 
in their heaven’. But not even the Aristotelian thinks that benefit received thus 
accidentally is going to count as providence. 
 
4. The Transitivity of Providence 
Our evidence for the difference between Platonists and Aristotelians in their views of 
providence is fully explained, then, by referring it to differences in their respective 
metaphysics, specifically their aetiological theories. It is because the first god of the 
Platonists is the cause of order for the cosmos as a whole, something in turn made 
possible by the posit of forms which are available to this god as a model for the unified 
complexity of the cosmos as a whole, that they are able to claim that god’s providence 
extends to ‘everything, including men’ (fr. 3.22-4). The causal complexity required to 
explain the sublunary cosmos in the Aristotelian system, by contrast, is achieved by an 
accumulation of causes which are individually creatures of divine providence, but in 
aggregation a product of chance. 
 But Platonists go a step further than this. One might still be concerned that, 
while the demiurge is responsible for the cosmos as a whole, it is hard to see how he can 
be responsible for the welfare of individuals – except incidentally, insofar as the species 
11 
 
is well conceived, for example;
16
 but, as we have seen, incidental benefit is not the same 
thing as providence. This is where the world soul becomes important.  
 I noted above that Platonists believe that cosmic order importantly involves the 
heavens as a mechanism designed to transmit benefit to every individual generated 
within the cosmos. As such (and as I have already indicated), the heavens are the 
principal organ for the work that the world soul does in preserving the harmony of the 
world, and specifically in governing the generation of individuals within it. In other 
words, sublunary individuals are not in fact the immediate objects of the creator’s 
providence – and could not be so, given the metaphysical constraints on the demiurge. 
But they are the immediate and non-incidental objects of the providential care of the 
world soul, and that in turn is part of the providential dispensation of the world for 
which the demiurge is responsible.  
 This is where things start to get interesting for the question of the relationship 
between humans and god. For something else that we can infer from Atticus’ debate 
with the Aristotelians is that it is common ground between them that providence can be 
transitive. What I mean by this is that, under the right circumstances, providential 
benefit can be received from its source through intermediaries – the ‘right 
circumstances’ being that those intermediaries are themselves immediate beneficiaries 
of providence from the same source, and are acting as such.
17
 We can presumably see 
this principle at work in the Aristotelian system in the assumption that every heavenly 
body is the beneficiary of the providential activity of the first unmoved mover. The first 
unmoved mover, after all, is only the immediate cause of the movement of the first 
heavenly sphere; all other spheres benefit from its activity only insofar as they are 
moved in turn by this, first sphere. It seems, then, that we are being invited to think that 
the first sphere is passing on or enacting the providence of god himself: that the first 
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 By ‘individual’ I mean here specifically the transient individuals of natural, sublunary species. 
The heavenly bodies, which are ensouled individuals, but everlasting, and crucial structural 
features of the cosmos, may perhaps be helpfully viewed as sui-generis individuals for which 
the demiurge is the immediate cause.  
17
 In other words: if a shows providential care for b and b shows providential care for c, then a 
shows providential care for c. (By the definition of providence I have reconstructed for 
Platonism, a shows ‘providential care’ for b just when a is non-accidentally a cause of good to 
b, in virtue of being good itself.) 
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unmoved mover is somehow understood to be immanent in its own activity as a 
transmitter of order. 
 Applying the principle to the Platonist system ought to allow us to say that, 
when the world soul is acting providentially towards us (human individuals), then 
equally the demiurge is acting providentially towards us; that the providence of the 
demiurge is immanent in the activity of the world soul. And there is evidence that 
Atticus assumes just this, at the very beginning of the quotation in fr. 3. Atticus here is 
looking for texts that prove Plato’s view that we are beneficiaries of divine providence, 
and he finds two. One is a famous passage from the Timaeus which will be instantly 
familiar as a description of the demiurge. But before this, he cites a rather less well-
known passage from the Laws, which a moment’s thought will show must be a 
reference to the world soul (3.16-24 des Places):
18
 
 
Plato sees all things in relation to god and as derived from god, for he says that 
god ‘holds the beginning and middle and end of all things, and accomplishes his 
purpose directly as he revolves’ [Laws 715e-716a]. And again he says that ‘he is 
good, and there is in the good no envy about anything, and he made everything 
outside himself as good as possible . . . bringing it to order from disorder’ 
[Timaeus 29e-30a]; he cares for everything, including men, and has taken the 
trouble to brings as much order as possible to everything. 
 
One does not need to be aware of the context of the Laws quotation to see that it has the 
world soul in mind (although the world soul is as a matter of fact the highest god 
considered by the Laws). The reference to this god ‘revolving’ (περιπορευόμενον) puts 
the matter beyond doubt: as we have seen, the world soul governs through the 
revolutions of the heavens. (The demiurge does not move at all, or have the parts to do 
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 Opsomer (2005) argues for a general tendency among Middle Platonists to give the world 
soul itself demiurgic responsibility, and one have might wondered whether this is what is 
reflected in the present passage: in other words, whether Atticus in fact only has the world soul, 
qua demiurgic, in mind. But it happens that Atticus is the one person for whom we can be sure 
this is not the case. The question with Atticus is not whether he gives the world soul demiurgic 
functions, but whether he posits a (non-rotating!) divine soul which is prior to the world soul 
and associated with the demiurge (cf. Opsomer 2005: 74-6).  
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so.) So it is a striking fact about this passage that Atticus encourages us to have both the 
world soul and the demiurge in mind, but does not allow us to differentiate at all 
between the providential benefit we receive from one god or the other. And this makes 
sense if we are to think that it is in fact (via the principle of transitivity) the very same 
providential activity. The providential activity of the demiurge is immanent in the work 
of the world soul.  
 If this is right, of course, then it should already start to become clear why the 
question of how ‘metaphysical’ or remote the demiurge is understood to be from an 
ontological perspective is irrelevant to the question from a religious perspective of how 
‘personal’ or reciprocal a relationship might be possible with him. Our relationship with 
the demiurge can be just as personal as our relationship with the world soul.  
 That might still sound a little remote and abstract – although already the world 
soul, insofar as it encompasses the heavens as the locus for its thinking and providential 
care for us thereby encompasses traditional objects of Greek piety, the heavenly bodies 
and the gods associated with them. But in any case, the principle of transitivity allows 
the agency of divine providence to come even closer to us than that. Indeed, our most 
direct testimony to the principle applies it to the activity of daimones, identified by a 
number of Platonist sources as the immediate objects of particular religious cults.
19
 The 
following passage is a quotation from another second-century Platonist, Celsus. Celsus 
is here defending the worship of daimones from the Christian position that to worship 
subordinate daimones denies the supreme claims of God on our service. But ‘why 
should we not worship daimones?’ responds Celsus (quoted at Origen, Against Celsus 
7.68, tr. after Chadwick): 
 
Are not all things indeed administered according to god’s will, and is not all 
providence derived from him? And whatever there may be in the universe, 
whether the work of god or of angels, or of other daimones or heroes, do not all 
these things keep a law given by the greatest god And has there not been 
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 Cf. Plutarch, Abandoned Oracles 416C-417A, 435A; Apuleius, On Socrates’ God 13-14, 
148-50. Bernard (1994: 364-7) observes that the case for daimon-intermediaries is made by 
Apuleius in his emphasis on the impassibility of the celestial gods – as compared with the 
passibility which daimones share with human beings. The observation holds for Plutarch too. 
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appointed over each particular thing a being who has been thought worthy to be 
allotted power? Would not a man, therefore, who worships god rightly worship 
the being who has obtained authority from him? 
 
‘This,’ concludes Origen, ‘is how Celsus thinks one man can “serve many masters”.’ 
But his sarcasm denies Celsus’ point, which is that, since daimones are the ministers of 
the demiurge, it is his providence that they enact. (For precision, we could add that the 
daimones in fact have their commission via the celestial gods, or the world soul whose 
thinking they collectively enact;
20
 but, since the world soul is in turn exercising the 
providence of the demiurge, it is nonetheless still the providence of the demiurge that 
the daimones are exercising, as Celsus says.) It is not only compatible with the 
recognition of God’s supremacy and providence that we should worship the daimones, 
it is entailed by it. In worshipping the daimones we are worshipping the demiurge.
21
 
 The same thought can be found elsewhere in our evidence for second-century 
Platonism. Indeed, so important is the principle of transitivity for establishing our 
relationship with god that a terminology was invented for it. A number of Platonist texts 
talk, namely, about ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ providence: ‘primary’ providence 
belonging to the demiurge, and secondary providence to the world soul (or to the 
heavenly bodies in which it maintains cosmic order). Compare, for example, Apuleius 
(On Plato 1.12, 205-6): 
 
The first providence is that of the supreme and most exalted of all gods, who not 
only set in order the celestial gods, whom he dispersed through all the part of the 
cosmos to preserve and adorn it, but who also made it the case that by nature that 
those mortals who surpassed other terrestrial creatures in wisdom would achieve 
unending days, and who established laws for the arrangement and preservation of 
everything else (laws which are constantly required) and passed them to the 
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 Cf. Apuleius, On Plato 1.12, 205-6 as quoted below; also On the God of Socrates 6, 132-4, 
where the daimones are likewise ministers of the celestial gods. 
21
 See also Finamore (2006), esp. 37-9, with Apuleius, Socrates’ God 132-4. Could this be an 
explanation for the fact that Apuleius can (claim to) use a carving of Mercury as an icon in his 
worship of Plato’s ineffable first god (Apology 61-4)? 
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keeping of other gods. Taking up this providence, the gods of secondary 
providence kept it so assiduously that everything, even what the heavens show to 
mortals, holds fast to the immutable station ordained by the Father. He reckoned 
daimones (which we [sc. Romans] can call Genii and Lares) to be ministers of the 
gods, and guardians of men and their intercessors in case they should want 
anything from the gods. 
 
 This language has often been noted and described as a Platonist ‘doctrine’, but 
little attempt has been made to explain what it is a doctrine about.
22
 I suggest that it 
expresses the important idea that providence can be passed down the line from the 
demiurge to the world soul. In saying that the world-soul is ‘secondary providence’, 
Platonists do not mean that the world soul exercises its own providence, which is 
secondary; the point is rather that the world soul secondarily exercises the very same 
providence, namely the providence of the demiurge.  
 As to daimones (whose immediate divine superior, as I noted, is the world soul, 
not the demiurge) – two of our texts in fact talk about a ‘tertiary providence’, which 
applies precisely to their work – presumably, just when they are understood faithfully to 
enact the providential work passed on to them from the celestial gods, or the world soul 
at large.
23
 (The reason why some of our sources make a point of saying that there are 
two providences, while some that there are three, will also be explained on this account: 
it is that only some Platonists, including those who talk about three exercises of 
providence, believed that there were daimones who were reliably good and, to that 
extent, part of the permanent mechanism for the transmission of providence. Others 
were not so sure. Apuleius for example believed that daimones could be beneficent, but 
were no more certain to be so than human souls, which for him occupy, in fact, the 
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 For discussion and references, see Boys-Stones (2007), esp. 436 with n. 25 (my own 
suggestion there, at 445-7, was that the language was essentially rhetorical, and intended to 
herald a higher form of providence to that acknowledged by the Stoics). Cf. also now Drews 
(2009), 596 (which has the merit of seeing that ‘secondary providence’ plays a role of 
mediation). 
23
 See ps.-Plutarch, On Fate 568E; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man 43, 126.15-21 Morani. 
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same ontological class.
24
 So he can talk about daimones doing god’s service, but does 
not tend to assume that, as a genus, they will always be exercising his providence.) 
 
5. Philosophy as religion 
What this discussion has shown, then, is that Platonism systematically vindicates 
religious observance: it recognises the traditional gods and approves their worship – 
(with only one significant correction, perhaps, to traditional sensibility, which is that all 
divinities, at least all whose worship is approved, are beneficent, and none is malign). 
Indeed, it does more than this: it assimilates all such deities into an inflection of 
monotheism: a theory of deity according to which the properly divine aspect of all 
divine beings, their ability to be causes of good, is the immanent activity of one god, 
namely the first principle. As Celsus suggests, the worship of any god is worship of the 
supreme deity; conversely, that we encounter this supreme principle in his subordinates. 
Not that they stand proxy for him, but that he is immanent in them.  
 And the remarkable thing is that it is metaphysics that does this. The question of 
whether the Platonist god is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘religious’ is misplaced. Even the 
question of whether a ‘metaphysical’ description of this god can be squared with 
‘religious’ language sincerely used of him is misconceived. On the one hand, there is 
nothing remotely anthropomorphic about the first principle; but it turns out, on the 
other, that that is no bar to our having a personal and reciprocated relationship with him. 
(E. R. Dodds, discussing the negative theology that results from Platonist metaphysical 
interpretations of the Parmenides, quotes the remark of Dean Inge that ‘one cannot 
worship the alpha private’.25 In fact one cannot really worship anything else.) 
 But all of this is only in the end to say in effect that Platonism has an analysis of 
causality which is supportive of conventional religious practice, or gives it 
philosophical justification. I started out with a slightly different question: how can the 
philosophy itself be the religion?  
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 Apuleius, On the God of Socrates 13, 147-8 (but see all of 13-16). Plutarch thinks that 
daimones and souls are merely different states of the same entity: Abandoned Oracles 431B. 
25
 Dodds (1928), 141: see Inge (1918), vol. 2, 115. Similarly Dillon (1986), 217, of Plutarch: 
‘One does not dance, I think, in honor of the Good, or of the One.’ 
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 I have presented evidence that the world soul, and daimones too (at least those 
daimones who were good in nature), were agents of divine providence: that is, that they 
were non-accidental causes of benefit in virtue of the providential benefit that they 
received in their turn. But given the way in which this mechanism works, there seems to 
be no principled reason why we ourselves, we human beings, could not become agents 
of providence as well – namely when we become virtuous. Virtue is standardly defined 
for Platonists as ‘likeness’ (or ‘assimilation’) to god’: ὁμοίωσις θεῷ. The formula is 
sometimes taken to be a simple exhortation to a particular kind of activity which is, or is 
like, an activity engaged in by god: for example, the contemplation of forms. But the 
focus of surviving discussions of the virtues is much less on what you should do, and 
much more on how you should be. The idea – obviously inspired by the account of 
justice in Republic 4 – is that we ought to acquire the right state of soul, and the right 
kind of actions will follow.
26
 I take it, then, that ‘coming to be like god’ really involves 
acquiring a state in virtue of which one is a cause of good order and benefit just as god 
is.
27
 But if we think that this state of being is our telos, the fulfilment and enjoyment of 
a capacity which is the larger part of god’s providential gift to us,28 then – if the 
principle of transitivity holds – the virtuous human being would turn out to be an agent 
of providence and even, as such, a manifestation of god.  
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 See e.g. Alcinous, Didaskalikos 29.1, 182.15-19 (and similarly Apuleius, On Plato 2.5, 223): 
‘Virtue is a divine thing: it is the perfect and very best state of soul [διάθεσις ψυχῆς] , which 
makes a man graceful, harmonious and constant in what he says and does, by himself and with 
respect to others.’  
27
 Alcinous, Didaskalikos 28.3, 181.42-4, specifies that the assimilation is to ‘the celestial god’, 
not the ‘hyper-celestial god’. If, as I suppose, he means by this that we should aim to be like the 
world soul as opposed to the demiurge, the point might be motivated by a concern to head off a 
mistaken view of the ideal life as one which involves transcending immediate concern for 
particulars. In fact, Alcinous thinks, the good that the virtuous person does, in virtue of being 
good, needs to be directed immediately towards other individuals within the cosmos, just as is 
the good that the world soul does. (We, after all, do not have the intermediaries for this work 
that the hyper-celestial demiurge has.) It is true that this reading involves a particular view of 
Alcinous’ divine hierarchy, a topic which is a matter of some controversy: but note that my 
principal argument about the implications of huamn assimilation to the divine is not affected in 
any case. If I am right that every god in a given Platonist system exercises the very same 
providence, then the result is the same whichever god one is conceived as coming to be like.  
28
 Cf. Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 550E; Maximus, Oration 38. Neither talks about ‘providence’ 
in so many words, but both say that virtue is the greatest of the gifts we receive from the gods. 
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 This might sound like an overblown and unlikely claim, but some Platonists of 
the period express just this as the purpose for the descent of souls to human lives in the 
first place. There were followers of Taurus, we are told, who thought that the gods sent 
souls to earth so that, through them, they might become manifest there themselves:
29
 
 
For this is the will of the gods: to manifest themselves as gods through the souls; 
for they are on display through the pure and unstained life of souls (ταύτην γὰρ 
εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν τῶν θεῶν, θεοὺς ἐκφαίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν ψυχῶν· προέρχονται 
γὰρ εἰς τοὐμφανὲς οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἐπιδείκνυνται διὰ τῶν ψυχῶν καθαρᾶς καὶ 
ἀχράντου ζωῆς). 
 
And this thought should not strike us as surprising, from the moment we saw that 
daimones may be agents of providence: as I noted above, daimones are generally 
understood by Platonists either to be numerically identical with human souls, or at least 
to occupy in the same ontological class as human souls. If they, when they are good, can 
be agents of providence, there seems to be no good reason why humans, in the cases 
(however rare) when they too are good, might not be also be agents of providence.
30
 It is 
worth noting too that when Celsus justifies the worship of daimones on the ground that 
they are ministers of the creator, he mentions heroes in the same breath. But if a hero 
differs from a daimon it is precisely by being (or having been) an extraordinary human 
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 The whole testimonium is a quotation from Iamblichus, On the Soul at Stobaeus, Eclogue 1, 
378-25-379.6 Wachsmuth = Taurus fr. 34T Gioè. Previous commentators have baulked at the 
literal meaning of the claim: Festugère, for example, paraphrases: ‘pour donner en spectacle la 
vie divine’ (1953:  219 n. 6). Gioè (2002: 375) repeats Dillon’s comparison with the Christian 
thought that God made us ‘for his own honour and glory’ (1980: 359) (neither gives a reference 
for this thought, but cf. e.g. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.6): but there is no suggestion that the 
gods are seeking any form of benefit for themselves.  
30
 Cf. Bonazzi (2012) on the ‘daimonic’ character of the philosopher. (Atticus actually refers to 
Plato’s ‘daimonic nature’ in fr. 3.26-7 des Places.) Plutarch thinks that the perfect(ible) part of a 
human being, the intellect, is a ‘daimon’, and that we are more ‘daimonic’ the more virtuous we 
are (On Socrates’ Daimon 591DE); similarly Apuleius, Socrates’ God 150-2, and esp. 157, 
where Socrates’ wisdom and virtue is such that he appropriately worships his own intellect 
(animus). 
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being, that is, extraordinarily virtuous – that is, ultimately successful in philosophy. 
Plato, indeed, is described as a heros by Apuleius.
31
 
 A perfectly virtuous human being, then, is a minister of the gods, and of the first 
god; their ‘assimilation to god’ is such as to make their activity god’s activity, their lives 
manifestations of god’s life, and in this, of course, to find their own perfection. But 
since virtue can only be acquired through philosophy, and is identified with the perfect 
practice of philosophy, then to do philosophy coincides exactly with what it is to be (in 
this very strong sense) a minister of god and to find one’s perfection through 
assimilation to god. So whether one thinks of religion in terms of divine service, or (in 
‘eschatological’ terms) as a matter of pursuing one’s own ‘salvation’, it turns out that 
philosophy, and especially metaphysics, really is the pre-eminent manifestation of 
religion.
32
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Durham University 
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 On Plato 2.8, 229. The successive transformation of humans into heroes and daimones is 
mooted by Plutarch at Abandoned Oracles 415B and stated in the Life of Romulus 28. A third-
century inscription commemorating a (Platonist?) descendent of Plutarch called Aristobulus 
praises him for possessing ‘every virtue’, and describes him both as a ‘perfect philosopher’ and 
as a ‘hero’ (IG VII 3425 = Syll.3 844B). Back in the first or second century, the anonymous 
commentator on the Theaetetus is happy to take Socrates’ remarks at 151c-d rather literally as 
evidence that Socrates’ good will made him ‘like god’ (coll. 58-9). 
32
 I gratefully acknowledge the benefit I have enjoyed from discussing these ideas with 
audiences in Cambridge, Toronto and (with special thanks to Radcliffe G. Edmonds) Bryn 
Mawr; and from membership of the IAS at Princeton for Spring Term 2013 where the final draft 
was written. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Translation of Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 15.5.1-14 (798b-801a) = Atticus, 
fr. 3 des Places (numbers in brackets refer to lines in des Places’ edition): 
 
(3) Again, Moses and the Hebrew prophets, and indeed Plato, who is in agreement with 
them in these matters, have set out their views on (5) universal providence with great 
clarity. But Aristotle brings the realm of the divine to a halt at the moon, and keeps the 
remaining parts of the cosmos fenced off from god’s care. In this view he is also refuted 
by the aforementioned author [sc. Atticus], who goes through the arguments as follows:  
Of all the things that help one to achieve (10) happiness, the greatest and most 
important is faith in providence. This above all keeps human life on the right 
track, so long as we don’t intend to be unsure ‘whether by justice the race of 
earthborn men may scale the lofty wall, (15) or by perverse deceit’ [Pindar fr. 
213.1-3 Snell]. Plato sees all things in relation to god and as derived from god, for 
he says that god ‘holds the beginning and middle and end of all things, and 
accomplishes his purpose directly as he revolves’ [Laws 715e-716a]. And again 
he says that ‘he is good, and there is in the good no (20) envy about anything, and 
he made everything outside himself as good as possible bringing it to order from 
disorder’ [Timaeus 29e-30a]; he cares for everything, including men, and has 
taken the trouble to brings as much order as possible to everything. 
(25) And a little further on: 
So Plato. But that man who casts off this daimonic character, excises the soul’s 
hope of the hereafter, and removes all reverence for superior beings right now – 
what has he (30) in common with Plato? How could he exhort anyone to what 
Plato has in mind, or give credence to his words? It is obvious that his 
collaboration tends in precisely the opposite direction, that his aid is for those who 
wish to commit injustice. For if someone were to (35) despise the gods and think 
them irrelevant to him on the grounds that, while alive he lives far away from 
them, and when dead no longer exists, then, as a human being possessed of human 
urges, he would readily want to indulge his desires. It is not impossible to be 
confident that one can commit injustice without being found out – if it is only 
necessary to avoid detection by humans. (40) In fact it is not always necessary 
that you should seek to evade notice, if you can wield power over the people who 
have seen you. So the way is open for injustice where people despair of 
providence. In his great benevolence, Aristotle holds out to us pleasure as 
something good, and offers us release from fear of the gods – (45) and then thinks 
he can provide a mechanism to prevent injustice. He acts like a doctor who 
neglects to give any help while the patient is still living, but when he has died tries 
to come up with mechanisms for saving the dead. The Peripatetic is like this. For 
the pursuit of pleasure itself does nothing (50) to encourage injustice like a refusal 
to believe in divine concern. ‘What then?’ someone might say. ‘Do you put 
Aristotle and Epicurus in the same case?’ Absolutely – on this matter, anyway. 
What difference is there as far as we are concerned whether you locate the divine 
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outside the cosmos (55) and allow us no contact with it, or whether you imprison 
the gods within the cosmos but keep them away from what happens on earth? 
Both alike think the gods have no concern for men, and provide the unjust with 
the same freedom from fear of the gods. (60) As to the idea that we receive some 
benefit from them although they remain in their heaven: in the first place, that is 
something we share with irrational creatures and inanimate objects; but then even 
Epicurus thinks that men get some benefit from the gods. At any rate, they say 
that the superior emanations that come from them are responsible for great goods 
in those who partake in them. (65) But it is not right to count either of them on the 
side of the argument for providence. On Epicurus’ account, the effect of 
providence disappears, even though the gods devote a lot of care (so he says) to 
the preservation of their own goods. Likewise (70) for Aristotle, providence will 
disappear even if the heavenly bodies are arranged in some sort of rank and order. 
We are looking for a providence that is distinguished by its concern for us – and 
that is not available for anyone who denies that daimones and heroes and souls in 
general are able to survive. (75) In my judgement, however, Epicurus seems to 
have come up with a position that is more modest as well. It is as if he despaired 
of the gods’ ability to abstain from caring for men if they found themselves in the 
same place: so he settled them as it were in a foreign country, and established 
their home outside the cosmos, and then blamed (80) their lack of concern for 
man on their removal, their separation from everything. But this extraordinary 
sleuth of nature, this unerring judge of matters divine, placed human affairs under 
the very sight of the gods and let them go unheeded and uncared for, (85) 
organised by ‘nature’ rather than god’s reason. So Aristotle can’t reasonably 
escape that criticism which some people level against Epicurus, namely that it was 
not through his own conviction but out of fear of men that he allocated the gods 
space in the universe – as if allocating them a seat in a theatre. (90) The evidence 
they adduce for his real conviction is the fact that he denies them any activity 
exercised towards us, which is the only thing that would make the existence of the 
gods grounds for a proper faith. But Aristotle does the same thing. Since he sets 
the gods apart, and hands faith over to sight alone – (95) a weak faculty for 
making judgements over so long a distance – it will perhaps seem to be only 
through shame that he says there are gods there. For since he does not allow that 
there is anything outside the cosmos, and does not bring the gods into contact with 
things on earth, he had either to admit that he was a complete atheist, or else 
maintain the reputation of apparently allowing the existence of the gods (100) by 
exiling them somewhere like that. To excuse the aloofness of the greater beings 
on the grounds of their distance from society at least presents atheism gracefully. 
This is what Atticus had to say against Aristotle’s rejection of the theory of providence.
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